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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF, UTAH
REl\JIINGTON RAND, INC.,
a corporation,
Appellant and Plaintiff,

-vs.'rHURMAN E. O'NEIL and
LOIS S. MACHADO, fdb~ A-1
Typewriter Cornpany,
Defendants,

No. 8598

-vs.DALE E. GRANT and UTAH CASH
REGISTER EXCHANGE, INC., a
corporation,
Respondents and
Garnishee Defendants

•
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case was before the Supreme Court on a prior
appeal taken by Dale E. Grant and Utah ·c·ash Regis,ter
Exchange, Inc. The present appeal is by Remington
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Rand, Inc., from an order of the District Court of Salt
Lake County granting the motion of Grant and Utah
Cash Register for Summary Judgment in a Garnishment
proceeding.
On January 24, 1955, Appellant Remington Rand,
Inc., recovered a judgment against Thurman E. O'Neil
for $4,243.82 (R. 68). In an attempt to satisfy this judgment, Garnishments were served on Utah Cash Register
Exchange, Inc., and Dale E. Grant on March 18, 1955
(R. 62, 60). On March 26, 1955, the Garnishee.s filed
their Answers to the Interrogatories contained in the
Garnishments (R. 64, 65).
On April 5, 1955, Remington Rand filed its Reply
to Answers of Garnishees (R. 83, 84) and on April 18,
1955, judgment against the Garnishees was ordered by
the District Court of Salt Lake County. On April 19,
/. 1955, formal Garnishee Judgment against Garnishee
Grant in amount $3,600.00 was signed (R. 66, 67).

•

On April 27, 1955, Garnishee Grant served his
Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Garnishee Judgment.
This motion was set for hearing on May 2, 1955 (R. 71,
72, 73, 74, 75) at which tin1e judgment against both
garnishees wa.s entered nunc pro tunc as of April 19,
1955, in amount $3,600.00 (R. 51, 52, 54, 55, 56).
On June 6, 1955, Garnishees Grant and Utah Cash
Register appealed from the judg1nent against them (R.
80), and on February 15, 1956, this court filed its deciSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sion reversing that judgment (R. 162). The reversal
was based upon the fact t:h.at no proof was made that
the Reply to the Garnishees An.swers was served upon
the Garnishees. Remington Rand filed Petition for Rehearing but rehearing was denied on June 21, 1956
(R. 161).
On July 27, 1956, Garnishment was again served
upon Utah Cash Register and Grant. (R. 155, 157). The
garnishees filed their Answers to the Interrogatories
contained in said Garnishments on August 4, 1956 (R.
159, 160), and on August 15, 1956, plaintiff served and
filed its Reply to Answers of Garnishees (R. 165, 166).
Later, the garnishees served Interrogatories upon
Remington Rand designed to point out that no indebtedness other than that referred to in the original Reply
to Answer.s of Garnishees was claimed. This was admitted by the Answers to Interrogatories filed September 11, 1956 (R. 167, 168, 173, 174). On October 3,
1956, Garnishees moved the District Court of Salt Lake
County for Summary Judgm~nt. Judgment w.as entered
on October 25, 1956, (R. 183, 184), whereby it was ordered
that all claims of Remington Rand against Garnishees
Grant and Utah ·C·ash Register arising out of any indebtednes.s prior to the second Garnishments be not further
maintained against the garnishees. This judgment was
based upon the conclusion that the failure to serve a
Reply in the original garnishment proceedings concluded
Remington Rand from .asserting· indebtedness arising
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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prior to that time. It was also ordered that the request
of Remington Rand for leave to file an Amended Reply
in the original Garnishment proceedings be denied. From
this judgment Remington Rand appeals.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
MO·TION OF GARNISHEE DEFENDANTS FO·R SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
AN AMENDED REPLY TO THE ANSWERS TO THE INTERRO·GATORIES CONTAINED IN THE O·RIGINAL GARNISHMENTS.

ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
MOTION OF GARNISHEE DEFENDANTS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.

The garnishees successfully urged their Motion for
Summary Judgment in the. trial court by contending that
the effect of the decision of February 15, 1956, by the
Supreme Court was to void Remington Rand's Reply
to the Answer of the G.arnishees because it was not
proved that it was served upon the Garnishees. Garnishees therefore contended that Re1nington Rand had,
in legal effect, failed to reply at all, and under the provisions of Rule 64D(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
"is deemed to have accepted the Reply .as correct".
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Thus, the garnishees contended, Remington Rand
is forever bound by the denial of indebtedness asserted
by the Garnishees in their Answer. The· trial court
accepted this view and incorporated it in the judgment
now under attack in this appeal.
This interpre~tation of Rule 64(i) is both strained
and technical and distorts and extends the true meaning
of the decision of this Court in the former case in that
it gives conclusive effect to a decision in which the
merits of the controversy were not under consideration.
Rule 64D (h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in part :
"If the garnishee answers, the plaintiff may,
within ten days after the expiration of the time
allowed for the filing of such answer, serve upon
the garnishee and file a reply to the whole or
any part thereof ... "
Rule 64D (i) provides in part:
"If the plaintiff fails to reply to the answer
of the garnishee, he shall he deemed to have
accepted it as correct, and judgment may be
entered thereon."
Rule 64D (i) itself employs different language from
that employed in Rule 64D (h). Rule 64D (i) relates
to failure to reply; Rule 64D (h) relates to service and
filing a Reply. Rule 64D (i) does not say that the plaintiff shall be deemed to have accepted the garnishee's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

answer as correct if he fails to serve a Reply as ·contended by the garnishees in this case.
The general rule where the garnishee defendant has
not obtained a judgment discharging him from re~ponsi
bility under the garnishment is that successive writs
may issue during the pendency of the proceeding. In
Lyon v. Pittsburgh Allegheny and Manchester T. Co.,
(Pa., 1933) 169 A. 229, Lyon served garnishment on
Pittsburgh which answered in such a way a.s to defeat
a judgment. Thereafter, Lyon served a further garnishment and Pittsburgh moved to quash. In affirming the
judgment of the lower court in favor of Lyon, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said that since the
second writ was not vexatious, Lyon could have as many
forms as nece.ssary to obtain satisfaction of his claim.
See also 33 C. J. S. 367 (Garnishment, Sec. 151).

.

Where, however, the· garnishee has obtained a judgment on the merits, such a judgment is res judicata
and the issues embraced may not be further litigated.
But, if the garnishee is discharged on a ground unrelated to the merits of the controversy such a judgment
does not preclude a further writ from issuing.

In Marsh, Jr. v. Phillips, Jr. and Coe, 77 Ga. 436
(1886), the Supreme Court of Georgia had before it
this question : Can Garnishment be served again on the
same garnishee after judgment has discharged him 1
The court said: Not if the judgment was on the merits
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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but if "on a mere technical poipt" the garni.shee may be
served again.
Where the statute or rule requires that the answers
to the interrogatories contained in the garnishment be
contested within a specified time, it is encumbent upon
the plaintiff to make a proper issue within the time
allowed. Thus, in Phelps v. Schmuck (Kan., 1940) 100
P. (2d) 67, where the garnishee insurance company
denied indebtedness to the defendant on August 13,
1937, and the plaintiff filed a further writ on June 8,
1938, the previous answers became conclusive of the
truth of the facts stated and the plaintiff was held to
have no further right to proceed against the garnishee.
The court noted that the plaintiff did nothing indicating any intention to take issue with the answers.
The statute required that within twenty days the plaintiff shall serve a notice in writing that he elects to take
issue on the answer.

No such requirement is found, however, under our
Rules, unless such requirement be imposed by judicial
legislation.
A statute imposing rigid requireme·nts upon a party
should not be extended beyond the fair import of its
language, for to do so would be to seriously limit the
efficacy of garnishment proceedings.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Reported decisions discussing this rather obscure
point .are few, perhaps because the vast majority of
garnishments issue out of courts of limited jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, as has been said :
"Garnishment is the most modern, and at the
same time the cheapest and most effectual, remedy
known to the law. While it is more especially
the small creditor's remedy, it is nonetheless
adapted to use in more important cases, and
our court reports abound with cases in which
judgments for many thousands of dollars have
been collected by this means. For one payment
that is enforced by execution, attachment, or bill
in chancery, twenty are collected by garnishment."
Rood on Garnishment, Preface, p. iii (1896).
II. THE DISTRLCT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE 'f.O FILE
AN AMENDED REPLY TO THE ANSWERS TO THE INTERRO·GATORIES CONTAINED IN THE ORIGINAL GARNISHMENTS.

If the trial court was dispo.sed to the view that
successive writs could not issue, then the trial court
should in its discretion have permitted the serving and
filing of a Reply to the original Answers made by the
garnishees. There was a genuine issue between these
parties as is amply demonstrated by the fact that at the
first trial, Re1ningion Rand recovered a judgment against
these garnishees for $3,600.00.
The ordinary effect of the reversal of a judgment
is to place the matter in the position that it was before
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the erroneous proceedings were had. See Phebus, et al
v. Dunford, Judge, et al, 114 Utah 292, 198 P. (2d)
973 (1948), where this court said:
"A reversal of a judgment or decision of a
lower court such as this places the case in the
position it was before the lower court rendered
that judgment or decision, and vacates all proceedings and orders dependent upon the decision
which was rever.sed."
Here, the garnishment proceedings should have continued from the point prior to the trial of the issues.
5 C.J.S. 1547 (~ppeal and Error, Sec. 1986). This court
did not hold that it was error to proceed to trial at all,
but simply that it was error to proceed to trial without
proper notice to the garnishee defendants.
It must be noted here that the garnishee defendants
did not seek a judgment under Rule 64D (i), discharging
them from responsibility under the Garnishments because
of the failure of the plaintiff to serve a Reply upon
them, until an adverse judgment had been entered against
them. Had they done so, the court would have noted
that a Reply had been filed within the time allowed
and would have undoubtedly extended the time for
serving the Reply under the discretionary powers given
by Rule 6 (b) permitting the enlargement of time after
the expiration of the specified period.
This matter still being unresolved at the time Garnishees moved for Summary Judgment, the District Court
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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should have permitted the serving and filing of a Reply
to the original Garnishments.
CONCLUSION
The entire tenor of the brief filed by Dale E. Grant
and Utah Ca.sh Register Exchange, Inc., in the previous
appeal, No. 8379, wa~ to the effect that all they wanted
was an opportunity to be apprised of the claim against
them and an opportunity to fully litigate those issues.
This is precisely what they now seek to deny Remington
Rand. They say there is no issue of fact even thoug4
when this matter was tried, a judgment was entered
against them.
It is submitted that there is a substantial issue
between Remington Rand and the Garnishees and that
this issue should be decided either on the Garnishments
served after the reversal of the prior judgment or in
the original proceedings, appealed from by the Garnishees.
Respectfully submitted,
SKEEN, ,.VORSLEY,
SNOW & CHRISTENSEN

Attorneys for Appellants
1501 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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